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Summary 
This working paper is an in-depth financial analysis of Mohawk Industries, a US-based flooring company.  
Our analysis examines the economic factors that impact Mohawk’s underlying business and how Mohawk 
has adapted to these ever-changing factors.  This economic analysis is then combined with our 
proprietary, Hanke-Guttridge Discounted Cash Flow (HG-DCF) model to determine Mohawk’s financial 
position.  The HG-DCF model will be presented along-side Monte-Carlo simulations to reveal the 
distribution of probable free cash flows and the likelihood of future earnings.  In addition to these 
quantitative factors, we also examine the compensation plans of Mohawk’s executives to assess 
alignment with shareholders.  At the conclusion of this analysis, it is our intention for readers to 
understand Mohawk’s business plan and the company’s financial standing to arrive at a sound investment 
decision. 
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Mohawk Industries, Inc. (NYSE: MHK) is a company that designs, manufactures, and distributes various 
flooring products.  Their products include carpets, rugs, laminates, ceramics, and vinyl tiling.  Based on 
historical averages and recent statements from MHK’s board, our Hanke-Guttridge Discounted Cash Flow 
(HG-DCF) model in conjunction with Monte Carlo simulations reveal that MHK’s probable free cash flow 
generation is approximately $224.86 per share.  Our model takes into account MHK’s 10% net sales 
growth (year-over-year, based on constant exchange basis), and recent announcements that future 
Capital Expenditure (Cap-Ex) levels will range from $600-650 million.  According to management, this re-
investment should support an additional $1.2-1.4 billion in future topline growth.  In addition, MHK’s 
management has guided that they are cutting costs, improving margins, and raising overall productivity.  
MHK’s board is led by Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeff Lorberbaum who is well-regarded by investors for 
his ability to capture market share efficiently by acquiring assets.  As of March 21st, 2016 MHK shares are 
trading at $188.50 per share, a 19% discount compared to our model estimates. Historic performances 
also reassure us that we have no reason to doubt MHK and Mr. Lorberbaum’s managerial ability thus 
mitigating execution risk.  As a result, we are rating MHK as a BUY.  
 
Catalysts and Risks 
 Foreign exchange rates attenuating sales and earnings growth. 
 General macroeconomic slowdown hampering consumer spending. 
 Patent expirations leading to increasing competition and price erosion. 
 Slow-down in property development and remodeling. 
 Management’s possible failure to execute an increase in capacity and an improvement in 
efficiency through Cap-Ex. 
 
Company Description and Historical Performance 
Mohawk Industries, Inc. (NYSE: MHK) is a vertically integrated company that designs, manufactures, and 
distributes flooring products for residential and commercial spaces.  The company was originally founded 
by the Shuttleworth brothers in 1902.  The brothers eventually changed the company name to, “Mohawk 
Carpet Mills,” in 1920 after merging with another mill in Amsterdam, NY.  Mohawk (herein referred to as 
MHK) completed their initial public offering in 1992 and has completed numerous acquisitions since their 
offering.  Most notably, MHK merged with Aladdin Mills in 1994 to create the current flooring 
conglomerate.  Interestingly, Aladdin Mills is the family owned business of MHK’s current CEO, Jeffrey 
Lorberbaum.  
MHK is headquartered in Calhoun, GA and generated over $8 billion in 2015 global sales with a market 
cap of $13.8 billion.  The Home Furnishings and Fixtures industry, a subgroup under Consumer Goods, 
includes the company.  In Dec 2013, MHK joined the Standard and Poor’s 500 and currently accounts for 
0.06% of the broad index.  MHK is also included in over 80 Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) the top five 
weightings of which include: 1) PKB-US (PowerShares Dynamic Building & Construction, 5.01%); 2) XHB-
US (S&P Homebuilders, 3.27%); 3) ITB-US (iShares US Home Construction, 1.94%); 4) LALT-US 




(PowerShares Multi-Strategy Alternative, 0.93%); and 5) FTC-US (First Trust Large Cap Growth AlphaDex, 
0.85%). Additionally, MHK’s competitive brand lineup includes Pergo, Marazzi, American Olean, Quick-
step, Bigelow, Lees and Unilin.  
Despite MHK’s brand lineup and dominant market share, the flooring industry is quite fragmented, has 
limited visibility, and the major players vary from segment to segment (e.g. carpet, rug, soft-flooring, etc.).  
As of 2014, MHK captured 26% of the carpet and rug business, the largest among all publicly traded carpet 
and rug companies.  However, if we consider private soft-flooring companies in our calculation of market 
size, Warren Buffet’s Shaw Industries captured 31% of the carpet and rug business.  From MHK’s 2015 10-
K filing, the ceramic flooring industry generated over $73.0 billion in world-wide sales for 2014.  MHK, 
which is considered the largest ceramic flooring company in the world, captured only 4.1% ($3.0 billion) 
of sales demonstrating the fragmentation of the industry when considering private companies.  Adding to 
the analysis complexity, the majority of ceramic flooring companies are private hindering visibility into 
market ownership.  This makes financial statements difficult to obtain and to audit.  Despite numerous 
competitors, MHK has been able to raise sales, margins, and earnings per share (EPS) over the last five 
years.  Numerous accretive acquisitions and successful product differentiation efforts are responsible for 
this trend. 
Business Segments 
As an international flooring company, MHK realigned their business segments in the second quarter of 
2015 to reflect their geographic expansions and diversified brand base: 
1. Global Ceramic – tile, porcelain tile, and natural stone products. 
a. Brands: American Olean, Daltile, KAI, Marazzi, and Ragno. 
2. Flooring North America – carpet, laminate, carpet pad, rugs, hardwood, and vinyl. 
a. Brands: Aladdin, Bigelow, Columbia, Durkan, Horizon, IVC, Pergo, etc. 
3. Flooring Rest of World – laminate, hardwood, roofing, insulation boards, medium density 
fiberboards, and vinyl. 
a. Brands: IVC, Moduleo, Pergo, Quick-Step, and Unilin. 
Inspection of revenue generation per segment reveals that Flooring North America was responsible for 
45% of net sales with the Global ceramic division contributing another 37% of net sales.  While these two 
are the largest contributors, they are competing in a saturated market with volatile growth prospects 
subject to macroeconomic factors outside of the Company’s control.  To offset this volatility, MHK has 
been able to lean on the Flooring Rest of World segment’s steady growth. In terms of geography, the ‘Rest 
of World’ designates operations in Australia, Brazil, Europe, India, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
Russia.  Of note, the recessions in Brazil and Russia are possibly muting MHK’s potential growth.  We 
acknowledge that emerging markets pose an interim risk, but the data also indicate that the ‘Rest of 
World’ businesses are currently growing at a faster rate than the North American businesses (see Table 1, 
below).  




Table 1: Mohawk’s Revenue mix and Segment Growth 
 
The key point to this table is that there has been unsteady revenue growth for 
Flooring North America and Global Ceramic while Flooring Rest of the World has 
experienced sustained high single-digit growth.  
 
Source: Mohawk’s SEC-10K  
Although it is clear from Table 1 that there are competing forces in play for revenue generation, we 
thought it was best to model MHK through overall company sales.  This method not only allows us to 
determine overall topline growth, in today’s prices, but it also reflects management’s holistic approach to 
improving MHK and reduces the number of adjustable variables leading to more robust conclusions.  For 
instance, MHK utilized Italian based designs from Marazzi to improve Flooring Rest of World which were 
inevitably converted into vinyl and tile products to benefit all operating segments.  Indeed, we find that 
integrating management’s guidance into our model is significantly more amenable to a single revenue 
projection. 
Historical Performance 
Over the last 10 years (2005 to 2015), MHK has increased average annual sales by 2.8% year-over year 
(y/y).  To better understand macroeconomic factors that affect MHK’s business, we conducted a 10-year 
analysis to evaluate the effects of the housing boom and crash (see Figure 1, below).  
Segment 2013 2014 2015 Assumed
Flooring North America 3,423,093 3,441,018 3,602,112
% growth 0.52% 4.68% 4.68%
Global Ceramic 2,677,058 3,015,279 3,012,859
% growth 12.63% (0.08%) (0.08%)
Flooring Rest of World 1,249,279 1,354,018 1,456,898
% growth 8.38% 7.60% 7.60%
Intersegment sales (676) (6,869) (306)
% growth 916.12% (95.55%) (95.55%)
Total 7,348,754 7,803,446 8,071,563
% growth 0.00% 6.19% 3.44% 4.81%





Figure 1: Total US Housing Starts from 2006 to 2015 
This figure demonstrates the current state of US housing developments.  The plot is year versus the units of Privately 
Owned Housing Starts (in thousands).  In 2006, US housing starts were booming, but crashed leading into the 2009 
Sub-Prime Mortgage crisis.  Since 2009, housing starts in the US have steadily recovered at an approximate linear 
rate. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed 3/25/2016. 
During the housing price peak in 2005, MHK increased net sales by 19.4% y/y.  Conversely, the collapse of 
the housing bubble resulted in a -21.7% sales decline for 2009 y/y.  These significant swings in sales 
demonstrate MHK’s inherent risk exposure to the housing market, and hence, overall economic growth 
and consumer confidence.  According to the US Census Bureau, housing starts are steadily recovering 
from the 2009 crash which can be appreciated by the approximately linear increase in housing starts in 
Figure 1 after the gray shaded region.  This is an encouraging trend for MHK investors should it continue 
(we leave it to the reader to decide on their macroeconomic view).  Upon further inspection, it becomes 
clear that MHK also has indirect exposure to Oil and Lumber prices, which correlates with consumer 
discretionary goods for home remodeling projects.  Although sales fluctuated between polar extremes 
over these last 10 years, Long-term Asset Turns (LAT = Revenue / Long-Term Assets, a measure of the 
Company’s efficiency) have ranged from 1.17-1.63 never falling below the 1.0 mark (Figure 2).  For 2015, 
MHK reached a LAT value of 1.21, which is below their 10-year historic average of 1.38 and indicates 
possible room for improvement.  In our model, we optimistically projected MHK’s LAT to reach 1.82 in 
their terminal period citing confidence in management and their ability to optimally allocate capital for 
long-run value creation.  We concede that this exceeds MHK’s historic LAT performance, but we believe 
that management has the track record and balance sheet to reach new efficiency levels. 





Figure 2: Mohawk’s Long-term Asset Turns (LAT, Blue) compared to Useful Life (UL, Orange) 
Long-term asset turns are an indicator of company efficiency and are inversely related to Useful life. Recently, 
Mohawk’s LAT has fallen below their historic LAT average (dotted Blue line) and slightly above their UL average 
(dotted orange line). 
 
LAT = Revenue/Long-term Assets      Useful Life = Long-term Assets/D&A 
 
Source: Mohawk’s SEC 10-K filings 
During the recent bull market (2011-2015), MHK has rewarded shareholders handsomely by 
outperforming the Standard and Poor’s 500 by nearly 4-fold.  In the last year MHK stock has pulled back 
from its August 19th high of $212, yet we believe there are near-term catalysts that will signal to investors 
that MHK has additional earnings power. Analysts covering MHK seem to agree with our hypothesis, since 
85.7% rate MHK shares as BUY (see Figure 3, below).  Confident in the macroeconomic landscape and 
MHK’s yet to be harnessed earnings power (from LAT), we built a Hanke-Guttridge Discounted Cash Flow 
(HG-DCF) model as detailed below to determine how much (if any) potential upside the company may 
provide upon investment. 





Figure 3: Analyst Recommendations for Mohawk from a Bloomberg Terminal 
As of 3/23/2016, 12 out of 14 analysts had a ‘Buy’ rating for Mohawk shares and an average target price of $218.82. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <ANR>. Accessed 3/23/2016 
 
Model Assumptions 
Our HG-DCF-MC models utilize historic averages and standard deviations of growth and margins as a 
baseline for our projections.  Typically, we use historic averages for revenue growth, cost structure, 
working capital, and Cap-Ex.  Historic long-term asset turns are also referenced as a litmus test for our 
model assumptions and projections to ensure we are not forecasting productivity that is unsustainable in 
the long run as we project the company into the future. We can deviate from these historic averages if 
management provides material information that will impact their business or have reason to believe.  
During the most recent earnings call (4th Quarter 2015), Mr. Lorberbaum revealed that MHK’s top-line 
growth was 10% after adjusting for foreign exchange headwinds.  He also disclosed that MHK will be 
allocating approximately $600-650 million towards Cap-Ex.  These reinvestments are earmarked to 
improve efficiency and support an additional $1.2-1.4 billion in sales.  For our model, we projected 
revenue growth to align with historic averages (9% y/y) slightly below management’s guidance.  We also 
assumed Cap-Ex will trickle down from sales and improve MHK’s cost structure.  Based on their 30+ 
acquisitions over the last 25 years, we are optimistic that MHK will increase capital expenditures. 




Balance Sheet and Income Statement Trends 
These results are contained in the ‘Balance Sheet’ and ‘Income Statement’ tabs of the 
accompanying spreadsheet. 
MHK’s acquisitive behavior becomes readily apparent upon inspection of the Balance Sheet.  This has led 
to an increase in Goodwill (+67%), Plant, Property and Equipment (+84%), Accounts Receivable (+83%), 
“Other intangible assets” (+500%), and an overall increase in assets by +60% over our historical survey 
period.  These asset increases have been slightly offset by a 73% decrease in cash levels, used to partially 
fund these acquisitions.  Interestingly, despite MHK’s acquisitive behavior their, “long-term debt, less 
current portion,” is remarkably steady.  From this, we interpret that MHK’s leadership has managed their 
leverage very well.  This is implicitly reflected in Moody’s upgrading MHK’s credit rating to Baa2 with a 
stable outlook.  
Given MHK’s acquisitive nature, it behooves us to consider if the ability to generate free cash flow is 
sustainable and how the company has managed debt on their balance sheet historically.  Should there be 
any distress in the company, this would most likely reflected in the credit markets. To address this, we 
first analyzed MHK’s debt trends to assess historical leverage levels and then inspected whether individual 
bonds were signaling distress in the credit markets.   Towards this end, we also examined MHK’s ‘total 
long-term debt to equity’ ratio over the last 5 years.  From 2011 to 2015, the ‘total long-term debt’ figure 
for MHK increased steadily from 0.46 to 0.66 (see Table 2, below).  In contrast, the ‘long-term debt, less 
current portion’ (i.e. Non-current portion of Long-term Debt) did not demonstrate a systematically 
increasing trend.  This indicates that Mr. Lorberbaum replenishes MHK’s paid-off debts with newer debt 
to maintain a certain non-current, long-term debt to equity ratio (see Table 3, below).  Our conclusion 
from this coarse analysis in addition to management guidance is that MHK’s debt levels may fluctuate into 
the future, however, the net debt to equity ratio will not reach levels that would be problematic given 
MHK’s experience with debt management. 




Table 2: Mohawk’s Historic Long-term Debt Profile 
 
This table illustrates MHK’s rising Debt to Equity ratio. This increase corroborates with Mr. 
Lorberbaum’s Cap-Ex plans to increase capacity and efficiency through capital allocation.   
 
Total long-term debt = Current Portion of Long-Term Debt + Non-Current Portion of Long-Term 
Debt 
 
Source: Mohawk’s SEC 10-K filings 
 
Table 3: Mohawk’s Stable Non-Current Long-term Debt 
 
Mohawk has maintained a relatively stable amount of ‘long-term debt, less current portion’ (i.e. 
Non-Current Long-term Debt) over the last 5-years. Combined with the data in Table 2, this 
indicates that MHK replenishes their Non-Current Long-term Debt levels as they mature. 
 
Source: Mohawk’s SEC 10-K filings 
To assess individual debt repayments, we analyzed the distribution of maturing debt obligations in the 
future against our forecasted free cash flow values in Table 4 (see the following sections for details on the 
input into our model).  This maturing debt figure includes bonds, notes, fees to credit facilities, 
securitization fees, and capital leases.  Note that the approximate $2.0 billion of Maturing Debt for 2016 
includes a $645 million payment already realized on January 15th, 2016.  The remaining $1.4 billion of 
obligations will most likely be addressed with cash on hand and by MHK’s Senior Credit Facility.  When 
comparing total maturing debt obligations to the projected discounted free cash flows, we can see that 
MHK’s Free Cash Flow is either: 1) Outpacing the debt accumulation; or 2) Well-timed in a staggered 
manner where the debt maturities are spread out to allow for accumulation of Free Cash.  Given that we 
are using the discounted cash flow and not the free cash flow as a proxy for debt repayment, we remain 
confident that the Company will meet its debt obligations.  According to SEC filings, MHK has bonds 
maturing in 2016, 2022 and 2023. Judging by the close proximity of these maturity dates, it seems Mr. 
Lorberbaum expects Free Cash flows to outpace debt accumulation rates (see Table 4, below). 
Year
Total long-term debt
(in thousands of $)
Total equity
(in thousands of $)
Total long-term 
debt to Equity
2011 1,586,439 3,449,508 0.46
2012 1,382,942 3,719,617 0.37
2013 2,260,008 4,470,306 0.51
2014 2,253,440 4,422,813 0.51
2015 3,199,931 4,882,815 0.66
Year
Non-current long-term debt












Table 4: Mohawk’s Maturing Debt Obligations and Projected Discounted Free Cash Flows 
 
From 2011 to 2015, we believe Mohawk increased their leverage ratio (Total Debt:Equity) 
to increase capacity and efficiency. By comparing the projected Discounted Free Cash Flows 
from 2016 and beyond to the corresponding maturing debt Obligations, we can see that 
Mohawk is well-positioned to pay their debts. Furthermore, the large spread between the 
Free Cash flow and Debt obligation indicates improved capacity and efficiency. 
 
The Discounted Free Cash Flow here is levered. Discount Rate used is 10%. 
 
HG-Discounted Free Cash Flow: 




Sources: Mohawk’s SEC 10-K filings 
To see if credit market sentiments agreed with our debt ratio analysis, we examined how MHK’s bonds 
currently trade.  We note that a full analysis of credit distress should encapsulate every debt issuance, 
however, such an analysis is outside the scope of this paper and we found that the conclusion is robust 
amongst all bonds we inspected.  To demonstrate the sentiment of the credit markets, we decided to 
evaluate one of Mohawk’s unsecured senior notes that was issued in 1/28/2013 for $600M with a 3.85% 
coupon rate.    This note is set to mature on February 1st, 2023 (see Figure 4, below) which would lead us 
to conclude that the company is not showing symptoms of financial duress.  
Year
Maturing Debt Obligations
(in thousands of $)
Projected Discounted Free Cash Flows













Figure 4: Description of Mohawk’s Corporate Bond, maturity date of 2/1/2023 with 3.85% coupon rate. 
Provided in this figure is an overview of bond details including rating (Moody’s Baa2), amount issued, coupon rate, maturity 
date, issue price, etc. 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <CORP>  <DES>. Accessed: 3/29/2016 
From November 2015 through March 2016, the bond has consistently traded at a premium (Figure 5, 
below).  We decided to use this time span to see if bond investors reacted to the statements made by 
MHK’s management during the 2015 earnings call.  The earnings call was on 2/26/2016. Judging by the 
timing and the price trends, it seems the fixed income market agrees with our analysis: MHK will generate 
future earnings for bondholders.  Thus, we conclude that should MHK take on additional debt in the future 
for acquisitions, the company will most likely not find itself in financial duress. 





Figure 5: Mohawk’s corporate Bond Prices from 11/30/2015 to 3/29/2016. 
This figure lists the price and volume activity for Mohawk’s corporate bond that matures on 2/1/2023 with a 3.85% coupon 
rate. The first column lists the dates of bond trading and the adjacent column to the right are the corresponding prices. 
Notice the steady increase in prices from 11/30/2015 to 3/29/2016. Of note, MHK’s 2015 earnings call was on 2/26/2016, 
this call was also followed by a slight uptick in price. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: CORPTDH 
Similar to the balance sheet, the income statement has seen positive trends over the last 5 years. From 
2011-2015, MHK generated growth in top-line sales (+43%), operating income (+165%), and net income 
(+253%). During this period, Mohawk’s management increased EBITDA margins by ~400bp. Management 
has also guided that more improvements are on the horizon.  Given our confidence in the balance sheet 
and income statement, we turned our attention to the operational efficiency of the Company to 
determine how to forecast future earnings. 
 
Value Drivers (HG-CF) Tab 
These results are contained in the ‘HG-CF’ tab of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
To determine MHK’s historical performance for forecasting, we determined the historical margins in 
addition to the value drivers of the company.  Upon inspection of these statistics, a few items stood out 
(for reference, please refer to the accompanying Spreadsheet uploaded to the Institute website).  First, 
MHK’s interest expenses have remained stable, which reflects their relatively flat long-term debt in 




absolute value.  We also see the effects of actively acquiring over 30 companies via escalating Cap-Ex 
levels.  However, the most concerning variable for Mohawk was their change in Working Capital.  The 
change in Working Capital has dramatically fluctuated over the last 5 years as can be appreciated by the 
standard deviation.  As a result, this variable contributes significantly to the uncertainty in our forecasts 
upon performing Monte-Carlo simulations.   
This is uncommon for a large, well-established company such as MHK. Dramatic changes are usually 
hallmarks of growing companies, but perhaps that is exactly what Mr. Lorberbaum is targeting.  If we 
utilize recent trends, then management has decreased the daily capital-requirements.  We are not sure 
how long this trend will continue, especially given MHK’s acquisitive nature.  As MHK continues to acquire 
companies, their balance sheet will continue to grow and increase the likelihood that change in Working 
Capital will have to follow suit. Indeed, acquiring new companies will be accompanied by uncertainties in 
the daily capital requirements contributing to these capital fluctuations until the business is fully 
integrated.  For the model, we assumed that change in Working Capital will actually decrease (-2.94% y/y) 
as a result of quality re-investments (7.5% Cap-Ex).  These re-investments will not only maintain current 
assets, but will also improve MHK’s cost structures.  We noticed that management has steadily reduced 
Cost of Sales by 400 basis points (bps).  We believe this trend will continue for another 150bps.  For Selling, 
General, & Administrative (SG&A), we deducted 100bps based on management’s comment that sales 
force and distribution center efficiencies will also improve.  With these assumptions of revenue growth 
and value drivers in hand, we forecasted cash flows into the future to determine the fundamental value 
of MHK. 
Model Results 
 These results are contained in the ‘DCF’ tab of the accompanying spreadsheet. 
With our base-case assumptions, the HG-DCF model yielded a probable free cash flow of $224.86 per 
share of MHK.  Although our assumptions seem optimistic, they are in fact grounded on historic trends 
and management’s guidance.  We admit that LAT has begun to enter uncharted territories (>1.63) by the 
final forecasted period, but we think management is re-investing earnings to build capacity to justify such 
a Bullish forecast.  Another way to assess company efficiency to justify our view is to examine the Return 
on Invested Capital (ROIC).  Similar to our LAT analysis, we examined MHK’s ROIC from 2006 to 2016 
(Figure 6, below).  In addition, we also charted the US housing starts from 2006 to 2016 to examine MHK’s 
return as housing starts recover.  As shown in Figure 6, MHK’s ROIC (white line) seems to correlate with 
US housing starts (green line).  This relationship is supported by the fact that 45% of MHK’s sales are from 
the US (see Table 1).  From 2006 to mid-2009, MHK’s ROIC and US housing starts show similar trends.  
However, from mid-2009 and onwards the difference becomes apparent. We ascribe this spread to Mr. 
Lorberbaum increasing capacity through the acquisition of quality assets, which synergized with MHK’s 
existing assets to improve overall efficiency. 





Figure 6: Mohawk’s Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) and US housing starts from 2006 – 2016. 
On average, MHK has been able to generate ~5x returns on their debt and equity levels, ROIC (white line). US housing starts 
(green line) are shown to illustrate Mohawk’s efficiency.  The left vertical axis is housing units in thousands and corresponds 
to the green line, US Housing starts. The right vertical axis is ROIC.  Both are plotted versus time in year. 
 
ROIC = (Net income – Dividend) / (Debt + Equity) 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <GF>. Accessed 3/29/2016 
This corroborates with our thesis that management will increase company capacity and efficiency, 
resulting in new levels of performance.  To test the robustness of our forecast, we conducted a Monte-
Carlo simulation (see Figure 7, below), which places our estimated free cash flow per share at the 50th 
percentile of possible free cash flow distributions.  The current stock price is within the 45th percentile and 
indicates that the market has not accounted for these new possible earnings.  We acknowledge today’s 
stock price is near the median distribution.  Indeed, the distribution is relatively wide and has large 
negative and positive values.  This is most likely due to the 10% Standard Deviation for MHK’s revenue, 
Change in Working Capital, and Capital Expenditures over the last 5 years. Looking at MHK’s revenue over 
a 10-year period, we also noticed tremendous spikes and troughs. This volatility persisted for Cap-Ex as 
well.  The spikes are most likely due to MHK acquiring companies early on, which had a tremendous impact 
on sales growth and Cap-Ex. The troughs are most likely due to housing development slow-downs that 
occur cyclically.  Our analysis thus far indicates that MHK may provide return upon investment, however, 
to assess whether management compensation is aligned with our thesis and forecast, we analyzed the 
compensation plan provided for executives in addition to current trading multiples and whether they 
corroborate with our valuation. 





Figure 7: Monte Carlo Simulation Results from Mohawk HG-DCF model 
These are the results from 100,000 Monte-Carlo simulations of Mohawk’s discounted Free-Cash Flow model.  The plot is 
probability versus the possible discounted free cash levels per share. The pink portion of the figure indicates possible free 




 These results are based on an in-depth analysis of the proxy statement: SEC Filing DEF-14A. 
Given that management has discretion to allocate capital, we conducted a compensation analysis to see 
if management is obligated, or incentivized, to generate shareholder returns aligned with our investment 
thesis.  Mohawk’s CEO is Jeffrey S. Lorberbaum, age 62, and has been in his current role since 2001.  Prior 
to joining Mohawk, Mr. Lorberbaum was Vice President of Aladdin Mills, his family owned carpet business. 
In 1994, Mohawk and Aladdin merged, with Mr. Lorberbaum serving as president before being appointed 
CEO.  
According to Mohawk’s 2014 proxy statement, executive compensation is divided into 3 segments: 
1. Base salary 
2. Annual cash incentive 
3. Long-term incentive 






The base salary for named executives is based on marketplace rates, economic conditions and subjective 
individual performances. In 2014, all named MHK executives received a 2.5% increase in base salary. 
Annual Cash Incentive 
The annual cash incentive is based on 3 parameters: 
1. MHK must have a positive “adjusted operating income” for cash incentives to be 
distributed. 
2. The Annual Cash Incentive for named executives is taken from a bonus pool. 
i. This bonus pool is 1.25% of the adjusted operating income. 
ii. Mr. Lorberbaum was able to receive up to 24% of the bonus pool. 
3. The performance metrics used to determine the Annual Cash Incentive is tied to company 
EPS and business unit EPS. 
Table 5: Mohawk’s Executive Annual Cash Incentive Performance Metrics - EPS 
 Company EPS Carpet EPS Laminate & Wood EPS 
Threshold $6.55 $1.49 $2.16 
Target $8.15 $1.83 $2.43 
Maximum $8.75 $2.14 $2.75 
2014 Performance $8.18 $1.87 $2.34 
Source: Mohawk 2014 Proxy    
 
Table 6: Realized Cash Incentive for Named Mohawk Executives 
Named Executives 
Aggregate Performance Against 
Target 
2014 Award 
Jeffrey S. Lorberbaum (CEO) 103% $1,004,316 
Frank H. Boykin 103% $450,967 
W. Christopher Wellborn 103% $867,807 
Bernard P. Thiers 103% $491,116 
Brian M. Carson 103% $446,593 
Source: Mohawk 2014 Proxy   
 
Long-term Incentive Plan (LTIP) 
The LTIP parameters are as follows: 
1. MHK must have a positive operating income in the prior year. 
2. LTIP award is distributed as Restricted Stock Units (RSUs). 
a) Number of RSUs granted is based on Total Shareholder Return (TSR) over a 3-year 
period, and compared to peer companies. 
b) Peers (See Table 7) are selected according to similarities in Market Cap, Revenue, and 
distribution channels. 
 




Table 7: List of Mohawk’s Peers 
Armstrong World Industries The Sherwin-Williams Company 
Herman Miller, Inc. Snap-On Incorporated 
HNI Corporation Steelcase, Inc. 
Interface, Inc. Universal Forest Products, Inc. 
Leggett & Platt, Incorporated USG Corporation 
Lennox International Vulcan Materials Company 
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. Whirlpool Corporation 
Newell Rubbermaid Inc. Stanley Black and Decker, Inc. 
Masco Corporation Owens Corning 
Source: Mohawk 2014 Proxy  
 
3. The value of RSUs awarded is relative to base salary and determined by TSR. 
a) Less than 25th percentile of TSR = 0% of base salary value. 
b) Threshold is at 25th percentile of peers = 60% of base salary value. 
c) TSR at 50th percentile of peers = 120% of base salary value. 
d) TSR at 75th percentile of peers = 240% of base salary value. 
a. This system changed in 2015. The percent awarded is now based on a, “target 
award,” rather than as a salary percentage. The percent awarded will also range 
from 50 – 175% of the target award. TSR must still be maintained in the 25th to 
75th percentile range. 
4. Individual performances can also lead to additional RSUs for named executives. 
a) The number of RSUs awarded for individual performances is capped at 30% of base salary 
value. 
b) Individual performance is based on subjective measures such as executing productivity 
strategies, and capital plan projects. 
c) In 2015, this Individual Component will be based on quantitative metrics such as business 
segment performance. The individual performance awards will also have a, “target,” 
objective (based on percentage of base salary). The actual RSUs awarded will then be a 
percentage of this target, ranging from 0 – 175%. 
5. LTIP to invest ratably over a 3-year period following the grant date. 

















2014 1,082,144 2,907,489 1,004,316 11,753 5,005,702 
2013 1,055,750 2,586,033 1,583,625 12,560 5,237,968 
2012 1,030,000 2,222,106 1,036,000 9,251 4,297,357 
Source: Mohawk 2014 Proxy       
Based on our analysis, it is our opinion that MHK’s compensation structure is not a detriment to 
shareholders or our investment thesis.  Relative to stock performance, we feel that Mr. Lorberbaum and 
his team are adequately compensated for their duties.  In terms of qualitative assessments, we would like 




to note that Mr. Lorberbaum has a longstanding history in the flooring industry from his days at Aladdin 
Mills. More importantly, he appears to take tremendous pride ensuring MHK leads the flooring industry. 
 
Dividend and Share History 
 
Figure 8: Mohawk’s Shares Outstanding (Blue) and Equity Float (Red) from 2011 to 2015 
Interesting to see the equity float be greater than the shares outstanding. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: GF. Accessed 3/3/2016 
MHK has not declared any dividends over the last 5 years.  The company’s outstanding shares and equity 
float have increased over the last 5 years indicating that the company is not likely to dilute shareholder 
value by issuing equity for acquisitions.  The equity float is greater than the shares outstanding.  This may 
be the result of Mohawk shares being owned by the Aladdin group, which is Mr. Lorberbaum’s family 
owned business (see Figure 8, above). 
 
Management Guidance 
During the 4th quarter 2015/Annual earnings call, Mr. Lorberbaum provided some details on future 
expectations for Mohawk.  Mr. Lorberbaum and CFO, Frank Boykin, stated they expect 2016 Capital 
Expenditures to be in the $600-650 million range and that these expenditures will support an additional 
$1.2-1.4 billion in sales. When questioned about any possible future acquisitions, Mr. Lorberbaum stated 
that MHK’s balance sheet is capable of handling another $1.5 billion worth of debt. Both executives also 
reminded analysts that MHK’s management has not finished optimizing their business and there is still 
room for improvement.  In terms of economic factors, MHK also iterated that currency headwinds are 
depressing their sales, but volumes are increasing.  Considering the current muted economic conditions 
in Russia and Brazil, management was encouraged by increasing volumes.   Overall, they were very eager 




to remind investors that management has not finished their projects, implying analysts have not 
accounted all future earnings. 
Multiples 
 
Figure 9: Mohawk’s Price to Book Ratio from 2011 to 2015 
The trend for Mohawk’s P:B ratio seems to be following their stock price. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: GF. Accessed 3/3/2016 
In Figure 9 (above), Mohawk has a 2.07 average Price to Book Value ratio and 65.75 Book Value per share 
(MRQ).  According to these multiples, Mohawk should be valued at $136.10 per share.  If we use the 
current Price to Book Value of 2.85, each share would be valued at $187.39. From a historic Book Value 
standpoint, MHK shares are currently overvalued.  This is a slight concern.  However, we think that this 
increase in Price to Books ratio has not yet reached unsustainable levels, given MHK’s ability to integrate 
new assets (i.e. increase their books value).  Consistent with this assertion, consensus estimates have an 
increase in sales and EPS estimates forecasted into the future (Figure 10). 





Figure 10: Mohawk’s EPS from 2012 to 2017 
Both revenue and EPS figures have steadily increased and are projected to continue their trends. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: DES. Accessed 3/3/2016 
 





Figure 11: Mohawk’s P/E ratio from 2011 to 2015 
The last 5 years of P/E ratios have fluctuated. Very dissimilar to revenue and EPS trends. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: GF. Accessed 3/3/2016 
Judging by the historic averages for the EPS (7.17) and P/E (22.17) multiples from Figure 10 and Figure 11, 
respectively, Mohawk should be valued at $158.96 per share. Much like the historic Price to Book Value 
analysis, the EPS and P/E analysis indicates that Mohawk shares are currently overvalued.  We believe 
there are multiple reasons why this may be the case.  Firstly, multiples analysis are based on relative 
valuation and do not explicitly incorporate fundamental value of the company.  Secondly, we contend 
that given MHK’s brand recognition and market share, investors are willing to pay more per dollar of 
earnings than other competitors leading to this higher multiple.  Finally, given earnings growth, our thesis 
remains valid if the multiple does not compress into the future.  We believe that multiple compression 
would most likely reflect a deterioration of the general macroeconomic landscape for housing which is an 










Holders and Insider Trading 
 
Figure 12: Mohawk’s Institutional and Insider Shareholders 
It is reassuring to see executive officers, denoted by ‘Form 3’ and ‘Form 4’ sources, included in the top 15 
shareholders. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: OWN. Accessed 3/3/2016 
Figure 12 (above) is a list of MHK’s shareholders in descending order.  The top spot is held by Aladdin 
Partners, which is Mr. Lorberbaum’s family-owned carpet business.  Other notable Mohawk insiders, 
maked by the ‘Form 3’ source title, include Balcaen Filip, founder of IVC group, a luxury vinyl tile 
manufacturer that was acquired by MHK in the 4th quarter of 2015. Helen Suzanne is Mr. Lorberbaum’s 
sister and is also a large stakeholder in the company.  Inspection of insider trading reveals that Mr. 
Lorberbaum recently purchased shares of MHK from the open market, albeit those shares are from 
Aladdin Partners (Figure 13, below).  Lorberbaum has also stated on the record that he plans to keep his 
Mohawk shares for the foreseeable future.  MHK is also owned by large institutional investors such as 
Vanguard and State Street.  Another notable supporter of Lorberbaum comes from Third Point’s fund 
manager, Dan Loeb, who is a shareholder activist that is notorious for verbally chastising and ousting 
poorly performing executives. In MHK’s case, Loeb has publicly praised Lorberbaum for his managerial 
abilities.  





Figure 13: Mohawk’s Recent Insider Transactions 
Each red pentagonal shape represents a divestiture or sale of Mohawk shares. The green pentagonal shapes are 
purchases of shares. The plot is of share price versus time in year and month. 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminal. Command: <GPTR>. Accessed 3/3/2016 
 
Firm Specific Issues 
We are concerned that Mohawk has relied on acquisitions to generate growth.  This is reflected in the 
company’s Capital Expenditures, which has a 5-year average run-rate that is twice Depreciation and 
Amortization run-rates.  Dan Loeb, however, has praised Lorberbaum for being an active acquirer in this 
low-interest rate environment.  The upside to these acquisition is future capacity for MHK.  The Company 
now has offices in Europe, South America, and North America.  This global presence will allow MHK to 
continue taking advantage of their vertical integration and utilize their additional capacity.  
Conclusions 
MHK seems to be accumulating capacity and increasing its presence in the flooring business.  We believe 
Mohawk will capitalize on this excess capacity and increase sales to historic averages (9.05%), which will 
increase long-term asset turns to unprecedented levels and yield ~18% gain for shareholders.  A possible 
hole in our thesis is the change in Working Capital and if management can reach new levels of efficiency.  
We believe this execution risk is mitigated by MHK’s exceptional management, experience, and 




compensation plan being aligned with shareholders.  Overall, we think MHK’s management has 




We conducted a basic comparative analysis to gauge MHK’s position in the flooring industry.  Tarkett, a 
European flooring company, placed Table 6 in their 2014 Annual Report. From an investor standpoint, it 
is encouraging to see that peers view MHK as an industry leader. 
 
Table 9: Tarkett’s view of the flooring industry landscape for 2014 
In this table, Tarkett, a European flooring company, is presenting the competitive landscape. As you can see, 
Mohawk, with 5 product categories was considered the flooring industry leader. 
 
Source: Tarkett’s 2014 Annual Report 
We also performed a Monte-Carlo Simulation for a bull-case where management executed their Cap-Ex 
strategy in 2016 and subsequently entered into a historic average state (Figure 14, below). We assumed 
that once Cap-Ex effects are realized, Mohawk would steadily support a +9.0% y/y sales growth. From 
2017 onwards, we also assumed that Cap-Ex would return to 10-year historic averages (5.40% of net 
sales). We then projected Mohawk to become more efficient over time as capacity is utilized, thus 
decreasing daily capital requirements for the future.  All other inputs of our Monte-Carlo simulation were 
held constant. 





Figure 14: Bull case Scenario if MHK management executes 
These are the results from 100,000 Monte-Carlo simulations of Mohawk’s discounted Free-Cash Flow model. X-axis is possible discounted 
free cash levels per shares and Y-axis is frequency of the discounted free cash levels per share. The red portion of the figure indicates 
possible free cash flow levels that are above today’s stock price. The blue region denotes free cash flow levels are below today’s stock price. 
 
